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In Murphy, the IRS took the position that since both of the
parties had not rolled over the gain on the sale of their house the
entire gain on the sale of the house was taxable.'2 The IRS has
now reversed its position and agrees with the Tax Court that only
one-half of the gain is taxable under these circumstances. '"

Thus, when a married couple sells their house, files a joint
return, subsequently divorces, and only one of them purchases a
replacement home, they are jointly and severally liable for onehalf of the gain on the sale of their principal residence. Legal
assistance attorneys should consider the impact on their clients
when advising them whether to file a joint return if they are selling a home and seeking a divorce. Major Henderson.

1- 103 T.C. 111, 113 (1994).
'27

AOD 1996-007 (July 15, 1996).

Notes from the Field
A Special Forces Human Rights Policy
The Initiative
The use of the United States military to promote human rights
values in foreign militaries has taken on a much added significance in the post Cold War era. Emerging democracies often
look to American soldiers to assist them in establishing a lawbased military whose policies, rules, and practices are rooted in
respect for human rights.'
Although the term "human rights" does not immediately bring
to mind images of Special Forces soldiers in action, the decade
of the '90s has witnessed the use of "Green Berets" in missions
that reflect America's desire to inculcate human rights values in
the militaries of our friends and allies. Special Forces soldiers
have proved themselves as premier ambassadors in this regard.
Indeed, promoting human rights in the militaries of the nascent
democracies is clearly a priority mission for the Special Forces,
an organization uniquely qualified for such a task.

Shortly after assuming command of the United States Army
Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)) in May
1996,2 Major General Kenneth Bowra took swift action to ensure that all Special Forces soldiers thoroughly understood their
rights and responsibilities regarding human rights vis a vis the
host nation military. A first ever Special Forces Human Rights
Policy Memorandum issued by General Bowra addressed four
areas of concern.
First, all military personnel assigned to USASFC(A) or subordinate units deployed outside the continental United States,
either in permanent or temporary status, will receive human rights
awareness training. This training will be conducted by their respective legal advisors prior to deployment.
Second, deployed personnel will report all instances of suspected gross violations of internationally recognized human rights
immediately through the chain of command. All such reports
will be included in after action reports (AARs).
Third, so far as practicable, Special Forces commanders will
plan for and include human rights training as part of all training
provided to host nation military forces. Furthermore, command-

I Specifically, a state violates international human rights law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones seven types of actions that have gained
universal recognition as "gross violations" of internationally recognized human rights. Set out at Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
Stares (1987) § 702, Customary International Law of Human Rights, those seven gross violations consist of: (1) genocide; (2) slavery or slave trade; (3) the murder
or causing the disappearance of individuals; (4) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (5) prolonged arbitrary detention; (6) systematic racial discrimination; or (7) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
Headquarters, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The command consists of five active duty Special

Forces groups and two reserve groups. The active duty groups are located as follows: I st Group, Fort Lewis, Washington; 3d Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 5th
Group, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 7th Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and 10th Group, Fort Carson, Colorado.
Memorandum, Commander, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), to subordinate commands, subject: USASFC(A) Human Rights Policy (18
Aug. 96).
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ers are required to review exercise and deployment AARs to
evaluate the effect of human rights training initiatives on host
nation military forces and then make recommendations to the
USASFC(A) Commanding General for improvement.
Finally, the four page memorandum requires the USASFC(A)
Staff Judge Advocate to:
(1) ensure that all Special Forces group judge advocates
(GIA) undergo a human rights training program tailored to their
area of responsibility (AOR), which is given to deployed soldiers;
(2) assist each Special Forces Group to develop appropriate
human rights training programs that can be delivered to host nation military forces; and
(3) as opportunities arise, coordinate with host nation legal
counterparts to assess host nation military human rights training
programs and, as appropriate,recommend improvements to those
programs.

Major General Bowra issued the human rights policy because
he believes that an effective and efficient method of meeting the
challenges of "regional crisis" and "threats to democracy" is to4
reduce the chance of such activities arising in the first place.
One way to achieve this is to install in the host nation militaries
a healthy respect for human rights.
The sweeping requirements mandated by the USASFC(A)
policy memorandum, particularly as they apply to training host
nation forces, are not as difficult as they might first appear. In
large part, the militaries of many emerging democracies already
look to Army Special Forces as a model to assist them in defining how human rights concerns should properly function in their
respective military establishments and how that military itself
should fit into a more democratic form of government. Foreign
militaries instinctively turn to the United States Army Special
Forces for the following reasons.
First, the Special Forces are uniquely positioned to influence
the attitudes and, in some cases, even the structure and function
of the host nation military because they go where no other element of the United States military can. As noted by Lieutenant
General (retired) William P. Yarborough, "Other than Special
Forces, there is no element of the [United States] armed forces
that is capable of performing across the entire spectrum of what
5
is labeled, for want of a better term, low intensity conflict."

Special Forces soldiers perform hundreds of missions each
year in support of the warfighting commanders in chief and other
government agencies. These operations span the entire spectrum of conflict, to include direct action, foreign internal defense,
special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, security assistance training, humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics,
demining, and combating terrorism. Simply put, when it comes
to operating with host nation forces, Green Berets are everywhere doing everything. The deployment figures tell the tale. In
Fiscal Year 1995, for example, Special Forces soldiers deployed
on 1593 missions to 184 countries around the world.
Second, because Special Forces soldiers are extensively
trained in the language, culture, religion, and politics of the countries in which they operate, they are best able to foster genuine
military-to-military relationships. This applies to individual host
nations as well as to geographic regions. Thus, because of their
ability to perceive cultural nuances, Special Forces can tailor
each particular mission to make the maximum impression on their
military counterparts regarding the importance of human rights
concerns.
Third, more than any other arm of the United States military,
Special Forces exemplify to foreign militaries the success story
of a professional military force that can maintain a superb operational record while functioning in accord with human rights concerns. Almost without exception, foreign'soldiers are deeply
impressed with how human rights and military efficiency can go
hand-in-hand. Foreign forces know that, to the Green Berets,
concern for human rights has always been the sine quo non in
United States military operations.
Indeed, the promotion of international human rights and democratic behavior have long been critical themes of the United States
Army's Special Forces, regardless of the mission that they happen to be performing. President Kennedy routinely praised this.
unique quality, and no one who has followed the accomplishments of Special Forces soldiers in operations Provide Comfort
(Iraq and Turkey), Restore Hope (Somalia), Just Cause (Panama),
Desert Storm (Middle East), Uphold Democracy (Haiti), and the
Implementation Force (Bosnia) can doubt their value in this regard.
In short, United States Army Special Forces soldiers are universally recognized and respected as efficient, professional, and
humanitarian in their conduct. Lieutenant General (retired) James
T. Scott, the former Commander of United States Army Special
Operations Command, stressed this truism during a speech in
the summer of 1996. He stated, "I can tell you that Special Forces

The 1996 Defense Planning Guidance lists four primary challenges to United States security: (1) proliferation of nuclear weapons, (2) regional crisis, (3) threats to
democracy, and (4) threats to economy.
Lt. Gen. (ret.) William P Yarborough, Emerging SOF Rules and Missions: A Different Perspective, Special Warfare, July 1995, at 10.
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soldiers will... continue to serve as the conscience and the
6

example of lesser developed nations regardinghuman rights."

Finally, the "De OppressoLiber" motto of Special Forces reflects a profound concern for the inherent dignity of those who
are denied international human rights. Crossing all cultural and
social boundaries, this mentality makes Special Forces soldiers
an ideal models as they train host nation forces and assist in alleviating many of the conditions that breed human rights abuses.
By word and deed, Special Forces promote the message that
commitment to preserving human rights is the hallmark of a professional military serving the interests of a democratic nation.
This message is not lost on the host nation. For example, in
Haiti (which now officially has no standing military force), Special Forces worked closely with local citizens, political leaders,
and foreign forces on a daily basis. Without question, the red
thread that underlined every action taken in Haiti was the emphasis on respecting human rights. In the end, human rights concerns took root, in large part, because of the professionalism of
United States Army Special Forces.

~

The most common opportunity for Special Forces to influence the human rights practices of the soldiers of fledgling democracies, however, occurs during joint and combined exercises
for training. Green Berets often are quizzed by their counterparts concerning how one should respond to human rights abuses
committed by service members. Realizing that it is better to
draw on American history (to avoid unnecessary controversy),
Special Forces soldiers invariably rely on various American illustrations, such as the lessons learned from My Lai,' to explain
the practical necessity for abiding by the law of war and internationally recognized human rights law.

concerns to host nation military personnel. In preparing for operational missions in developing democracies, Special Forces
soldiers and their commanders must plan to specifically address
this challenge. Even the team level predeployment briefings
should anticipate human rights issues unique to the host nation.
Requiring a great deal of sensitivity, human rights training
packages that are specifically tailored to the wants and desires of
the host nation military should be available at planning conferences. Clearly, host nation forces are receptive to human rights
discussions only when they are presented in a nonthreatening,
nondemanding environment of instruction. In many cases, if the
host nation is adverse to the idea of discussing human rights issues, a very informal approach will reap the greatest dividends.
In other instances, host nation forces ask for more formal instruction about how the United States military approaches human rights issues.
To address the human rights concerns of individual nations,
Special Forces soldiers and their commanders have many resources available to them. The most important resource, other
than a soldier's solid moral compass, is the GJA assigned to each
Special Forces Group (there are five active duty Group legal
offices). Each GJA is thoroughly trained in human rights law
and has compiled an extensive collection of information dealing
with human rights issues related to the Group's AOR8 Apart
from providing the mandatory predeployment legal briefings to
all deploying soldiers, these specialized military attorneys stay
abreast of current doctrine involving international agreements,
changes in human rights doctrine, and political and social changes
in the regions.

Invariably, the four basic points stressed to host nation soldiers are: (1) human rights abuses are never tolerated by a democratic populace (e.g., the American public); (2) such violations
do not shorten the conflict, be it internal or external in nature,
but usually have the opposite effect; (3) the soldiers guilty of
human rights violations must be punished, or similar abuses will
surely follow; and (4) to maintain discipline and esprit de corps,
the chain of command must constantly train soldiers to respect
internationally recognized human rights and the law of war.

The USASFC(A) Staff Judge Advocate requires all GJAs to
maintain close contact with their military legal counterparts in as
many host nations as possible. Groupjudge advocates engage in
human rights training initiatives targeted at institutionalizing
human rights training in foreign militaries. This approach has
been extremely successful. Support from GJAs has ranged from
assisting the Thai military in establishing a human rights training
program for their junior military attorneys at the Royal Thai Military Law School in Bangkok to developing human rights training handbooks for military coalition forces in Haiti. 9 Special
Forces GJAs have also worked closely with United Nations personnel in Haiti and Bosnia.

Group Judge Advocates

Conclusion

The old adage that "you can't teach what you don't know"
particularly applies to explaining and promoting human rights

The post Cold War world presents new challenges to United
States Army Special Forces. A window of opportunity now ex-

Lt. Gen. (ret.) James T. Scott. Address at USASFC(A) Change of Command Ceremony (May 21, 1996) (transcript on file with Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,
USASFC(A)).
See. e.g., Jeffrey F Addicott & William A. Hudson, 25th Anniversary of My Lai: lime to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 Mil. L. Rev. 153 (1993).
See USASFC(A) Human Rights Handbook (on file with the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USASFC(A), Fort Bragg, North Carolina).
Many of these initiatives have been conducted through the Center for Law and Military Operations located at The Judge Advocate Generals School, United States
Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
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ists for Special Forces to make substantial contributions toward
building and strengthening human rights concerns in the militaries of the emerging democracies.

may be clouded by concerns about the literal dictates of Article
31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)," Article 31(b)
provides:

Just ten years ago hundreds of countries functioned under some
form of nondemocratic rule (in Latin America alone, over ninety
percent were nondemocratic). Today, the vast majority of these
nations operate under properly elected civilian governments, but
great nations are neither created nor sustained by accident. United
States assistance is often required to help solidify and, in many
cases, to create a true commitment to promoting and preserving
human rights.

No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from, an accused
or a person suspected of an offense without
first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have
to make any statement regarding the offense
of which he is accused or suspected and that
any statement made by him may be used as
evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. 2

Major General Bowra has made the promotion of human rights
in the militaries of the emerging democracies a top priority for
United States Army Special Forces. Recognizing that this new
mission cannot be accomplished without the proactive support
of his legal advisors, he has given judge advocates a critical role
in the process of promoting human rights. We will not disappoint. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey F. Addicott, Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne),
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

To Read or Not to Read... The Defense Counsel's
Dilemma Provided by Article 31(b), UCMJI0
The Dilemma
Military defense counsel seldom have the luxury of appointed
investigators. They are generally left to their own skills in accomplishing both the pretrial investigation and preparation of
the case for trial. Accordingly, their ability to obtain information is of paramount importance to the adequate representation
of their clients. Their ability to obtain information, however,

Thus, military defense counsels ("person[s] subject to this
chapter") face an unusual choice when interviewing a military
witness that they suspect may have committed offenses. They
must decide whether to advise the witness (suspect) of his Article 31(b) rights, and possibly lose the witness's testimony, or
proceed by interviewing the witness without advising him and
potentially violate Article 31(b). In the only decision on point,
the United States Court of Military Appeals' 3 (COMA) held that
military defense counsel should read Article 31 (b) rights when
14
questioning suspects.
The author believes that recent case law indicates that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces]" (CAAF)
has eliminated this requirement. According to this view of case
law, the CAAF has established new guidelines for Article 31(b)
rights warning requirements that do not require a literal interpretation of UCMJ Article 31(b) and do not require military defense counsel to read potential witnesses their rights when
preparing to defend a case.' 6

10This note updates the article written by then Major John B. McDaniel entitled "Article 31(b) and the Defense Counsel Interview." which appeared in the May
1990 issue of The Army Lawyer. See John B. McDaniel, Article 31(b) and the Defense Counsel Interview, ARmy LAw., May 1990, at 9. The opinions expressed in this
note are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the policy of The Trial Defense Service, The Judge Advocate General, or the Army.
10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1988) [hereinafter Article 31(b)].
12

Id.

13 On 5 November 1994, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, 108 Stat. 2663 (1994), changed the names of the United
States Courts of Military Review and the United States Court of Military Appeals. The new names are the United States Courts of Criminal Appeals and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, respectively. For the purposes of this note, the name of the court at the time that a particular case was decided is the
name that will be used in referring to that decision. See United States v. Sanders, 41 M.J. 485. n.1 (1995).

," United States v. Milburn, 8 MJ. 110 (C.M.A. 1979).
Is

See supra note 13.

16 For an excellent discussion of the historical background of this subject and case law prior to 1990, see John B. McDaniel, Article 31(b) and the Defense Counsel

Interview. ARMY LAw., May 1990. at 9.
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